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Abstract
In the absence of vaccines and effective antiviral drugs, control of the spread of coronavirus disease (Covid-19) relies mainly on the 
adequacy of public health resources and policies. Hence, failure to establish and implement scientifically reliable control measures may 
have a significant effect on the incidence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection, severity of the 
disease, and death toll. The average number of secondary transmissions from an infected person, or reproduction numbers (R0 and R), and 
the points at which the collective immunity begins to reduce the transmission of the infection, or herd immunity thresholds, are important 
epidemiological tools used in strategies of Covid-19 control, suppression, and mitigation. However, SARS-CoV-2 transmission through 
asymptomatic carriers and, possibly, aerosols, has been ignored, and this may affect the effectiveness of Covid-19 control strategies. 
Therefore, consideration of the two possible ways of transmission would substantially increase the values of reproduction numbers, but 
if estimates of the contingent of the population naturally resistant to the virus, plus those with pre-existing cross-immunity to SARS-
CoV-2 were considered, the evaluation of herd immunity thresholds should reach their real and achievable levels.
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INTRODUCTION
A pandemic’s destructive power is determined by three 
factors: the virulence and infectivity of the pathogen, the degree 
of natural resistance and immunity of the exposed population, 
and the adequacy of public health resources and policies. Because 
it is not possible to change the characteristics of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and there are 
currently no available vaccines, the response to the coronavirus 
disease (COVID-19) pandemic relies mainly on the suitability of 
public health measures. Hence, failure to establish and implement 
scientifically reliable control measures may have a significant effect 
on the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection, severity of the disease, 
and cause of death. 
The estimation of a new pathogen’s ability to spread is a key 
measure in an emerging infection outbreak. The basic reproduction 
number (R0) is the main metric used to describe it. R0 is defined as 
the number of secondary cases produced by one case in a completely 
susceptible population in the absence of any preventive measures, 
while the effective reproduction number (R or Re) refers to the 
average number of secondary cases generated by a single index 
case over an infectious period in a partially immune population 
and under the action of preventive intervention measures1. Unlike 
R0, R does not assume a completely susceptible population and, 
consequently, will vary depending on a population’s current immune 
status, which will change dynamically as an outbreak event or when 
a vaccination campaign unfolds2. The epidemic is growing when R 
is greater than 1, it is stable if R = 1, and is reducing if R is lower than 
11,2,3. The two basic strategies for the containment of the COVID-19 
pandemic – suppression and mitigation – make use of reproduction 
numbers but with different targets. Suppression strategies aim to 
keep reproduction numbers to an absolute minimum for as long as 
possible through quarantines and lockdowns to reduce person-to-person 
transmission and thereby prevent the disruption of healthcare 
systems. While mitigation strategies, however, do not aim at 
maintaining low reproductive numbers but at generating collective 
(herd) immunity as fast as possible by allowing controlled infection 
of people, and mitigating its effects4,5. 
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The point at which the collective immunity begins to reduce 
the transmission of the infection is known as the herd immunity 
threshold. The estimated R0 for SARS-CoV-2 infected people was 
2.56, which implies that, on average, two infected individuals will 
spread the infection to five others during the infectious period, 
considering that no immunity to SARS-CoV-2 exists in the 
population. The herd immunity threshold is defined as 1 – 1/R0. 
Hence, in the case of an R0 of 2.5, the corresponding herd immunity 
threshold will be 0.60, or 60%, meaning that when the proportion 
of SARS-CoV-2 immune individuals in the population reaches this 
point, the infection starts to be naturally controlled. 
The concept of herd immunity threshold relies on several key 
assumptions, including the occurrence of homogeneous mixing 
of individuals within a population, that these individuals are all 
susceptible to infection, and that all infected individuals will develop 
sterilizing immunity, which will confer lifelong protection against 
reinfection. However, these epidemiological and immunological 
assumptions are not usually accomplished in real-world situations1,2. 
Several criticisms may be raised regarding the assumptions 
underlying the R0 and R metrics and their calculations, and hence on 
the levels of herd immunity thresholds of COVID-19. Two of them 
refer to the failure in considering the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 
by asymptomatic carriers and the possibility of its occurrence in 
the airborne route. This failure probably gives rise to unrealistic 
estimates and poses doubts on the reliability of their use as important 
epidemiological tools of COVID-19 control strategies.  
TRANSMISSION OF SARS-COV-2 THROUGH  
ASYMPTOMATIC CARRIERS
The concept of asymptomatic carriers refers to individuals 
who test positive for SARS-CoV-2 by polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR), which indicates that they are infected; thus, they represent 
a risk of spreading the infection7. The role of asymptomatic carriers 
in transmission poses several challenges for the control of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. First, since the non-infected people feel 
healthy, they move around more freely and are less willing to accept 
protective measures such as facial masks, social distancing, and 
quarantining. Second, as they do not present clinical manifestations 
of respiratory disease, they are considered safe by their social 
contacts. Third, because they are asymptomatic, they are usually 
not tested for coronavirus, and their presence and number in the 
community remain unknown. Finally, the acknowledgment and 
dimensioning of the contingent of asymptomatic carriers and 
the establishment of their role in the network of transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2 are expected to produce a tremendous impact both 
on R0 and R and, therefore, on the strategies of surveillance and 
control of COVID-198,9.
Reliable positive PCR tests in asymptomatic individuals occur 
in four distinctive instances. First, the person is in the incubation 
period, which is the time between the moment of exposure to the 
pathogen and the appearance of signs and symptoms of the disease. 
Second, the individual has developed clinical manifestations, but 
has not yet had symptoms. Third, if the person turns PCR-negative 
later and has never experienced symptoms or signs, she should be 
regarded as having a subclinical disease or no disease at all due to the 
ability of the defense mechanisms to contain the virus. Fourth, if the 
individual continues to present no symptoms and the PCR remains 
positive for a long time, he is considered an asymptomatic chronic 
carrier10. In all these cases, individuals probably shed virus, which 
should be considered of epidemiological importance in control 
strategies. In a sample of 31 virologically confirmed asymptomatic 
individuals, 22 presented symptoms after hospitalization and were 
considered as pre-symptomatic in the incubation period, while the 
other nine remained asymptomatic during hospitalization. Although 
this latter group presented lower viral loads, the duration of viral 
shedding remained similar in both groups11, which stresses the 
role of asymptomatic carriers in the transmission of the infection. 
Differently from what had happened in SARS-CoV-1 infection12, 
the occurrence of asymptomatic carriers in SARS-CoV-2 infection 
is frequent13-20 and represents a considerable hindrance to the 
control of infection21,22. Based on mathematical simulations, it has 
been estimated that in China, 64%7 to 78% of infected individuals 
continue to be asymptomatic and undergo self-healing20, and 
they are responsible for 30% to 60% of the transmissions of 
SARS-CoV-222,23. However, the extent of truly asymptomatic infection 
in the community remains to be established because no widespread 
PCR testing has been performed. A recent study from China that 
appropriately defined asymptomatic infections and followed up a 
group of infected individuals suggests that the proportion of infected 
people who never developed symptoms was 23%24, which is within the 
range revealed by a systematic review from 6% to 41%, with a pooled 
estimate of 16% (12%-20%)25. The asymptomatic carrier’s relevance 
in SARS-CoV-2 transmission and the ensuing imperative to contain 
it is well illustrated by the experience of Vo’Euganeo, a completely 
isolated village of nearly 3000 people in northern Italy, where the entire 
population was subjected to PCR testing, and all those tested positive, 
from 50% to 75% considered asymptomatic, were quarantined. The 
number of people who were sick due to COVID-19 dropped from 88 
to 7 in less than 10 days26,27.  
An often disregarded aspect of public health policies, but with 
important consequences for control strategies, is the limitations of 
PCR-based molecular test, which is considered the gold standard 
for SARS-CoV-2 diagnosis28, especially due to the occurrence of 
false-negative results. It has been demonstrated that over the four 
days of infection before the typical symptom onset (day 5), the 
probability of a false-negative result in an infected person decreases 
from 100% (95% confidence interval [CI], 100% to 100%) on day 1 
to 67% (95% CI, 27% to 94%) on day 4, and on the day of symptom 
onset, the median rate a false-negative result was 38% (95% CI, 
18% to 65%)29. Such data indicate that an unknown but probably 
important contingent of asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic carriers 
escape detection by public health surveillance systems, which 
leads to the conclusion that the currently accepted estimates of 
the reproduction numbers (R0 and R) of the disease are inaccurate. 
TRANSMISSION OF SARS-COV-2  
THROUGH AEROSOLS
The routes of SARS-CoV-2 transmission may have an 
important effect on the estimation of R0 and R.  Two routes have 
been established: respiratory droplets and contaminated surfaces. 
Infected respiratory droplets are expelled when an infected person 
coughs, sneezes, talks, laughs, or sings30-33. The World Health 
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Organization has established that respiratory droplets (>5 μm) can 
transmit viruses only when a person is in close contact (within 1 
m) with an infected person who is coughing, sneezing, talking, 
or singing34. However, studies of the physics of exhaled air and 
flow physics have shown that this “safety zone” is valid only if 
the infected person is expelling exclusively large droplets (>5 μm) 
during normal breathing when the velocity of the exhaled air is 
approximately 1 m/s35. However, 82% of the individuals infected 
by respiratory viruses exhale small infectious particles (<5 μm)36, 
which reach to a distance much farther than 1 m35,37. If the person 
coughs, the velocity of the exhaled air is 10 m/s and the droplets 
are expelled to a distance of more than 2 m, and if she sneezes, 
the velocity is approximately 50 m/s and large droplets are carried 
more than 6 m away35. Transmission may also occur indirectly 
through touching surfaces in the immediate environment or objects 
contaminated with the virus from an infected person, followed by 
touching the mouth, nose, or eyes34,38-40. A third possible route is 
airborne transmission, which involves the spread of an infectious 
agent caused by the dissemination of microscopic particles (≤5 μm) 
in diameter (aerosols) that remain infectious when suspended in air 
over long distances and time. 
The World Health Organization conceded the airborne 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in aerosol-generating procedures such 
as tracheal intubation41, although the institution has been reluctant 
to acknowledge this route of transmission in other situations34. 
Nevertheless, it has been firmly established as an important route 
of transmission of other respiratory viral infections such as those 
caused by influenza viruses A and B; parainfluenza 1, 2, and 3; 
human metapneumovirus, human rhinovirus; adenovirus; measles 
virus; chickenpox virus; respiratory syncytial virus; Ebola virus; 
MERS-CoV; and SARS-CoV36,42-44. Therefore, it seems unreasonable 
to expect that SARS-CoV-2 would be the sole exception among 
respiratory viruses to not be transmitted by aerosols. Indeed, it 
has been shown that COVID-19 patients exhale SARS-CoV-2-
containing droplets into the air at an estimated rate of 103-105 
RNA copies/min45. Furthermore, it has been postulated that a large 
proportion of the spread of COVID-19 occurs through the airborne 
transmission of aerosols produced by asymptomatic individuals 
during breathing and speaking46,47. The aforementioned results are 
based on data obtained both in experimental settings and in real-
world situations. The controlled conditions in laboratory settings 
generate relevant, though limited data, which must necessarily be 
complemented by data obtained in real-world situations. It has been 
demonstrated that SARS-CoV-2 retained its infectivity and virion 
integrity for at least 16 hours in respirable-sized aerosols generated 
by nebulizers48. Moreover, viruses originating from human shedding 
may have an even longer survival in the environment because they 
are protected by components of the mucus34. Under experimental 
conditions, SARS-CoV-2 remained viable for 72 h on plastic, 48 h 
on stainless steel, and 24 h on cardboard49. 
Humans emit aerosols continuously through normal 
respiration50,51 and aerosol production increases during respiratory 
illnesses47. Although the infecting dose of SARS-CoV-2 is still 
unknown, it is speculated that a few hundred viral particles would 
be enough to cause the disease among susceptible hosts52,53, 
especially in poorly ventilated spaces, combined with low humidity 
and high temperature, as shown to occur with the influenza virus54. 
The infecting potential of aerosols depends on how and where they 
are produced. Ordinary speech aerosolizes significant quantities of 
respiratory particles and, for unclear reasons, certain individuals are 
“speech superemitters,” who emit aerosol particles of an order of 
magnitude of more than average, i.e., approximately 10 particles/
second55. A 10-minute conversation with an infected, asymptomatic 
superemitter, who was talking in a normal volume, would yield 
an invisible “cloud” of approximately 6,000 aerosol particles that 
could potentially be inhaled by a susceptible conversational partner 
or others in close proximity55. 
It has been found that loud speech can emit thousands of droplets 
and aerosol particles per second, which remain for 8-14 min in 
a closed environment56, but those droplets quickly disperse in a 
well-ventilated room57. During coughing in a closed environment, 
the emitted large droplets rapidly fall onto the ground within 1 s, 
whereas aerosols will take 9 min to reach the ground when produced 
at a height of 160 cm (i.e., average speaking or coughing height)57. 
However, when an infected person coughs or sneezes, a cloud of 
pathogen-bearing particles of different sizes emerges and travels 
up to 7-8 m from the point of emission58,59. The smaller size of 
aerosols (≤5 μm) in comparison to that of droplets provide them 
with special aerodynamic features. While respiratory droplets 
undergo gravitational settling faster than they evaporate, thereby 
contaminating surfaces and leading to contact transmission, aerosols 
will evaporate faster than they can settle, are buoyant, and thus can 
be affected by air currents, which may aid in their transportation 
over long distances, including outside the room46,60,61.
Observations from real-world situations appear to corroborate 
the experimental data indicative of airborne transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2. If, on the one hand, real-world situations are closer 
to reality than to experimental data, on the other hand, they cannot 
be either provoked – due to obvious ethical reasons – or planned 
because their data are collected a posteriori. Therefore, their 
results should be considered as suggestive of a phenomenon and 
not as a confirmatory factor of its existence. Real-life situations are 
usually based on the detection of SARS-CoV-2 by PCR in the air 
and objects of hospitals where COVID-19 patients were receiving 
care, including patient rooms, toilets, hallways, and outdoor areas, 
as reporting in numerous publications39,62-66. Virus loads varied 
from 1.8 to 4.1 viral RNA copies per liter of air and were higher 
in air samples collected close to the infected patient62,65. It seems 
plausible to consider that prolonged permanence in contaminated 
settings will have a cumulative effect on the exposure to virus 
particles.  However, these observations are limited by the fact that 
viral cultures were not performed in any of those studies; hence, 
the viability and infectivity of the virus could not be ascertained. 
The possibility of aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2 was also 
considered in a poorly ventilated restaurant in which infected 
individuals contaminated five persons seated close to them, without 
any direct contact or exposure to fomites67. The same possibility 
has been considered for numerous cruise ships where thousands of 
people aboard were infected when many of the infections occurred 
after the imposition of isolation that confined passengers for the 
majority of time to their cabins and limited direct contact, and with 
hand hygiene carefully followed47.
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The possibility of airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 
by aerosols results in several consequences for the strategies 
of the COVID-19 control. First, since this route is supposed to 
substantially increase the transmissibility of the virus, we must take 
this into account in the estimation of more realistic reproduction 
numbers (R0 and R), with a direct impact on the calculation of 
herd immunity thresholds68. Second, in contrast to droplets that 
carry viral particles that are deposited in the epithelium of the 
upper respiratory tract, aerosols that carry virus particles that can 
penetrate to the depths of the lungs, where they may be deposited 
in the alveoli69, and, supposedly, give rise to more severe disease70. 
Third, it has to be considered that aerosol-generating procedures, 
such as toilet flushing and, possibly, nose-blowing by infected 
people may spread the virus in the environment39,62,63,70-72. Finally, 
even considering that social distancing is of utmost importance for 
reducing the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 by virus-laden droplets, 
it is not realistic to maintain a safety distance of several meters, 
which is compatible with the demonstrated area of spreading of 
contaminated aerosols. This limitation stresses the importance of 
wearing face masks to contain SARS-CoV-2 infection. 
Face masks provide “inward” protection by filtering virus-laden 
respiratory particles that would otherwise be inhaled by an uninfected 
person and “outward” protection by trapping respiratory particles 
expelled by an infected person61. This reduces the risk of both direct 
and indirect viral exposure, thereby decreasing the probability of 
infection46,73. There is substantial evidence supporting the wearing of 
masks by the public during the COVID-19 pandemic74. It has been 
shown experimentally that face masks partially block virus-laden 
droplets and aerosols75, the latter being capable of retaining virus 
infectivity and integrity for at least 16 hours in the environment48. 
Indeed, face mask use results in great reduction in the risk of infection, 
both among healthcare workers and among the members of the 
community76,77. The filtration efficiency of face masks varies widely 
according to the material and the technology used for their fabrication 
as well as with the laboratory methodology employed to test them78,79. 
The best efficiency is achieved by disposable (or reusable under special 
conditions of decontamination) N95 respirators, which block, under 
ideal conditions, approximately 85% of particles sized less than 0.3 μm 
(aerosols), and 99.9% of the particles with this diameter, while surgical 
masks show 76% and 99.6% efficiency, respectively79. Reusable cloth 
masks have a wide range of efficiency, depending on the material used, 
the number of layers, and face fitness78-81. Considering the efficiency 
and the breathability, the best materials to make cloth masks are 
combinations of 100% cotton, nonwoven, and cotton jersey80. 
DISCUSSION 
Both an estimation of the contingent of asymptomatic carriers 
and the possible aerosol transmission must be taken into account 
to transform the reproduction numbers (R0 and R) and, hence, herd 
immunity thresholds, into more reliable epidemiological tools. 
The current policies for controlling the spread of the COVID-19 
pandemic are based on the estimates of an R0 of approximately 
2.5, a herd immunity threshold of around 60%6, and based on the 
assumption that, if no interventions were made, estimates of 7.0 
billion infections and 40 million deaths are expected82. Mathematical 
simulations show that the incorporation of the contingent of 
asymptomatic carriers to the estimates of the reproduction numbers 
would tremendously inflate their values9, giving rise to unreachable 
levels of herd immunity thresholds. However, this interpretation 
holds a fallacy: the all individuals of the population worldwide are 
susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection at its first encounter. 
There is no completely susceptible population, neither for 
SARS-CoV-2 nor for any other pathogen. A variable proportion 
of people are not infected on exposure to the pathogen, either 
because they present natural resistance to it, due to their genetic 
background or epigenetic makeup or because they had acquired 
protective immunity83-85. In the case of novel pathogens such as 
SARS-CoV-2, protective immunity results from cross-protection 
induced by contact with related or unrelated infectious agents from 
the environment, or from their own microbiota86,87. Moreover, it 
should be kept in mind that susceptibility is not an all-or-nothing 
phenomenon but a continuum, which depends on the degree of 
natural resistance and/or protective immunity the person presents. 
It ranges from complete susceptibility to complete resistance and 
comprises a spectrum of intermediate states, which give rise to 
the different clinical presentations of the infection, ranging from 
asymptomatic to mild, severe, or fatal disease. 
CONCLUSION
There is an urgent need for reliable estimates of reproduction 
numbers and herd immunity thresholds in which transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2 through asymptomatic carriers and, possibly, aerosols 
are considered. This substantially increases the estimation of the 
reproduction numbers. However, if estimates of the contingent of the 
population naturally resistant to the virus, of those with pre-existing 
cross-immunity to SARS-CoV-2, which comprise 20%–50% of 
unexposed people88-90, and of the proportion of individuals presenting 
post-infection immunity are jointly considered, herd immunity 
thresholds should reach their real and achievable levels. It is possible 
that the current reflux of COVID-19, which is seen in several parts of 
the world, after a dramatic death toll, may indicate that herd immunity 
thresholds have been attained. However, as far as quarantines and 
lockdowns are relaxed, and susceptible people come into contact 
with the different genetic mutations of SARS-CoV-2, it is expected 
that new outbreaks of COVID-19 will occur until herd immunity 
thresholds are achieved, naturally or through vaccination.   
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